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Abstract. This study was performed in order to reveal factors affecting abnormally low tenders 
(ALTs) and to minimize negative effects of them. A thorough literature review was carried out to 
observe past research about the reasons of and possible solutions to ALTs. A questionnaire was 
prepared and submitted to construction professionals to capture negative impacts of ALTs based on 
the interviews with experts and past literature. 430 companies responded to the questionnaire. The 
data analysis was carried out by the multinomial logistic regression statistical tool. Having quality 
control systems and restricted procedure with prequalification procurement systems were main 
significant factors to reduce ALTs. Based on all significant factors, recommendations were made to 
construction professionals and companies to reduce adverse effects of ALTs.
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Introduction 
The essence of the tender is making advanced productivity through the market competition 
mechanism so as to effectively promote economic development and social progress (Jun 
2013). However, one of the major problems in procurement in construction industry is ab-
normally low tenders (ALTs). Pricing decisions are fundamental in developing a marketing 
strategy (Coskun et al. 2013). Contracting authorities are hesitant to award a tender to the 
lowest bid as they doubt whether it is also the most advantageous compared to other bids.
The purpose of this paper is to assess the factors affecting ALT in public construction 
works and capture reasons and factors behind the problem. To achieve this goal, firstly, a 
literature review was carried out. Then, a questionnaire was developed and administered 
to construction professionals. 430 construction companies responded to the questionnaire. 
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Finally, multinomial logistic regression was used to capture factors affecting ALT inquisi-
tion rate and to make recommendations to the construction industry. 
1. Factors leading to abnormally low tenders 
Contractor evaluation is a vital part of the project management cycle and deals with risk 
and risk management. One of the most important phases in the construction industry is 
the bidding process (Turskis 2008). The competitive bidding system has been to blame for 
abnormally low bids, which are considered as one of the main causes of poor project quality 
(Lo et al. 2007). The low-bid method, typically used for competitive bidding in the United 
States, may result in a contract with a firm that submits either accidentally or deliberately 
an unrealistically low-bid price (Ioannou, Awwad 2010). Many governmental institutions 
and researchers try to capture the factors leading to abnormally low tenders. 
Banaitiene and Banaitis (2006) stated that only on the basis of quantitative and qual-
itative evaluation criteria and by comparing bids of contractors it is possible to select a 
qualified, competent and reliable contractor, to evaluate its qualification, economic and 
financial condition and technical capability and skills and to achieve relevant results in a 
construction project.
According to Calveras et al. (2003), the reasons of abnormally low tenders were expect-
ation of renegotiating the contract later on when it would be costly for sponsor to replace 
the existing company, taking a risky strategy for survival of a company which was in a bad 
financial state and protection of firms which went through bankruptcy by limited liability 
(bankruptcy laws).
In EU, some of the reasons for accepting ALT were insufficient risk analysis, lack of 
resources or skills, inadequate selection criteria, justification of contract awards and limited 
scope of EU directives (Harrower 1999).
Harrower (1999) mentioned that public entities did not operate on the basis of private 
risk capital so they could submit tenders far below the costs of private enterprise. Moreover, 
constrained financial situation of public authorities resulted in award of contracts to the 
lowest bidder but the problem was that they did not think of additional costs like deficient 
quality of work and supervision of work. 
As the reasons for awarding the bid to the lowest price, Unuvar (2004) listed insuf-
ficiency of risk analyses, lack of confidence among contracting authorities in their own 
conceptual cost and the anxiety of protecting interests of the government treasury.
Current study tries to capture the reasons behind the abnormally low tenders with the 
help of a questionnaire and analysis of the collected data through statistical means.
2. Literature review on ALTs 
Literature review on past ALT researches was carried out to have insight about ALTs and 
their possible solutions.
Lo et  al. (2007) mentioned that the competitive bidding system has been to blame 
for abnormally low bids, which are considered as one of the main causes of poor project 
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quality. They adapted system dynamics to develop a contractor’s pricing model with con-
sideration of the dimensions of cost, market competition and beyond-contractual reward 
(BCR). The model was then examined by statistical analysis of data collected from 44 
highway projects in Taiwan. It was found that the equilibrium market price is significantly 
associated with BCR, which is assumed to be determined by the strictness of the owner’s 
construction management, including both soundness of contract and tightness in construc-
tion supervision.
Gokce (2004) talked about the inquiry procedure of abnormally low tenders. Accord-
ing to the author, when the contracting authority was not sure about its own conceptual 
estimate, it awarded the abnormally low tender as the winner. Another reason of awarding 
the lowest bidder was the benefit of treasury.
EU issued a directive 2004/18/EC. This directive is about public supply, public works 
and public services. The general definition of ALTs, necessity of written explanations and 
their conditions are given in that directive.
Directorate General III published a report about abnormally low tenders. Causes for 
submitting ALTs and accepting ALTs, recommendations for preventing and eliminating 
abnormally low tenders were mentioned in that report. Economically most advantageous 
tender (EMAT) system was recommended to the client with this report (Harrower 1999). 
The most important issues in auction design are the traditional concerns of competi-
tion policy-preventing collusive, predatory, and entry-deterring behaviour. Ascending and 
uniform-price auctions are particularly vulnerable to these problems (Klemperer 2002). 
Detecting abnormally low bids in procurement auctions is a recognized problem, since 
their acceptance could result in the winner not being able to provide the service or work 
awarded by the auction, which is a significant risk for the auctioneer (Conti et al. 2012). 
In their study, a rank-and-compare algorithm is considered to detect such anomalous bids 
and help auctioneers in achieving an effective rejection decision. Analytical expressions 
and simulation results are provided for the detection probability, as well as for the false 
alarm probability.
In Drew and Skitmore (1997), multiple regression was used to construct a prediction 
equation relating bidder competitiveness (the dependent variable) to the independent vari-
ables of bidder, contract type and contract size. The regression model showed that differ-
ences in contractor competitiveness are greater for different contract sizes than for different 
contract types. The most competitive contractors appeared to be those with a preferred 
contract size range. Such a model can be used as part of a more systematic approach in 
prequalifying contractors. It may also be used by contractors as a basis for assessing bidding 
performance.
Six different identification strategies were tested empirically by application, both inde-
pendently and in pooled form, to several sets of auction data gathered from around the 
world by Skitmore (2002). The results indicate the normal density to be the most appro-
priate model and a multiple of the auction standard deviation to be the best identification 
strategy.
Ballesteros et al. (2013) presented a new test for detecting abnormally high or low bids 
among those who enter a tender, and taking advantage of the data, any tender analyst or 
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person in charge of supervising capped tenders will be able to suspect which bidders are 
involved in a cartel after identifying the same abnormal behaviour in a series of tenders by 
means of a simple method. 
Lo and Yan (2009) stated that abnormally low bids and contractors’ opportunistic bid-
ding behaviour are frequently observed in the competitive bidding system. Many research 
findings have pointed out that price competition itself is not sufficient to guarantee the use 
of economical and good quality products. Their paper developed a simulation model to 
analyse contractors’ pricing behaviour and dynamic competition process under the quali-
fication-based selection (QBS) system. 
Bergman, Lundberg (2013) compared theoretical results with actual procurements, as 
reflected in a sample of 189 Swedish public procurements of four services: elderly care, 
waste transport, food wholesale services and cleaning services. They found that the lowest 
price is used in more than one-third of the procurements while supplier selection based 
on scoring rules that include both price and quality measures are used in more than half 
of the procurements. They also argued that quality-to-price scoring outperforms price-to-
quality scoring.
Six different identification strategies were tested empirically by application, both inde-
pendently and in pooled form, to eight sets of auction data gathered from around the world 
by Skitmore, Lo (2002). The results indicate the most conservative identification strategy to 
be a multiple of the auction standard deviation assuming a lognormal composite density. 
Surprisingly, the normal density alternative was the second most conservative solution. 
Yu, Wang (2012) proposed an index named price elasticity of performance (PEP) that 
may serve as a quantitative measure to reach an objective decision. The theoretical model 
construction of PEP was also described. Two measures in the individual and market levels 
of PEP were defined. A design/build construction project was selected as a working ex-
ample to demonstrate the applicability of the proposed method. Potential applications and 
limitations of the proposed method are also addressed. It was concluded that the proposed 
PEP method has the potential to resolve the dilemma of pursuing efficiency and avoiding 
violation of regulations in traditional procurements. 
By using cluster analysis, five groups of bidders with distinctive bid profiles were identi-
fied and the associated bid markups were calculated by Hartono, Yap (2011). The emerging 
groups provide an empirical illustration on how the theoretical model is utilized. The the-
oretically grounded framework could be used by contractors to improve their own bidding 
strategy in anticipating the likely behaviour of the competitors.
Threshold tests were applied to identify common and unique categories and an absolute 
difference test to determine the principal categories of criteria used in the evaluation of 
tenders by Watt et al. (2009). The study, using a pragmatic and heuristic approach, resulted 
in the identification of eight principal categories suitable for our research program.
Conti, Naldi (2008) mentioned that procurement auctions may be affected by abnor-
mally low bids, whose acceptance may have negative consequences on the auctioneer. A 
method, based on the average submitted bid, was considered to detect such anomalous bids 
and aid the auctioneer in the possible rejection decision. Analytical expressions or simula-
tion results were provided for the detection probability and for the false alarm probability.
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A total of 670 hours of work observed in both firms revealed three stages of the bidding 
process by Laryea, Hughes (2011). Their findings explain why some assumptions underpin-
ning analytical models may not be sustainable in practice and why what actually happens 
in practice is important for those who seek to model the pricing of construction bids.
Alexandersson, Hultén (2006) studied the bidding behaviour of firms participating in 
public tenders of passenger railway services in Sweden. They discussed the various possible 
reasons behind high and low bids in tenders, linked to a discussion on pricing strategies 
and continuous and discontinuous economies of scale regarding costs of production.
3. Methodology
For this study, ALT evaluation was carried out by using a questionnaire form. The question-
naire had eighteen questions. Confidentiality was assured to the respondents. The question-
naire was arranged after the literature review process with the help of experts in this area. 
The questionnaire was distributed as hardcopies in the first run. Consequently, a 
webpage was developed and most of the responses were collected through that webpage. 
The webpage questionnaire was linked in parallel to other webpages to increase the number 
of responses. The questionnaire can be seen in Table 1. 
Table 1. Abnormally low tender questionnaire
ALT questionnaire questions Type of data collected
How many people are working at central office in your 
company?
Which type of works do you deal with?
Does your company work abroad?
How do you determine prices of each work item on bid 
package?
Which factor affects your final bid price at most?
If a bid was determined as the lowest tender, what are the 
reasons of it?
How often do you face abnormally low tender inquisition? 
How many tenders do you bid in a year? 
Do you use computer software for tender price calculation?
Which can be documented regarding originality of work  
and advantageous conditions in ALT inquisition?
Please scale materials/works according to advantageous 
conditions. 
(1 – most important, 14 – least important)
Do you think that not adapting to Public Procurement Law 
causes abnormally low tenders? 
Do you think that proper and sufficient quality control is 
applied especially in construction period?
Is restricted procedure with prequalification appropriate for 
solving abnormally low tenders?
Please indicate average percentage values for bid types you 
participate in a year? 
Is surety bond system appropriate for solving abnormally low 
tenders?
How can abnormally low tender problem be solved?
_____ #
Infrastructure, Power Plants etc.
Yes or No
Multiple Choice
Risk, Regular Payment etc.
Multiple Choice




Workmanship, Cement, Steel etc.
Yes or No
Yes, Generally, Sometimes, No
Yes or No
Lump-sum,Restricted, Negotiated
Yes, No, Not applicable 
_____
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4. Data characteristics
Four hundred and thirty companies filled out the questionnaire. The companies were also 
clustered as small, medium and large companies depending on the number of employees. 
The companies were grouped according to their sizes as small (1–5 employees), medium 
(6–25 employees) or large companies (>25 employees). The total number of small, medium 
and large companies was 247, 138 and 39 respectively. The data was collected in Turkey. The 
distribution of amount of work types according to size of companies can be seen in Table 
2. Amount of work types is the total number of types the respondent works on from the 
following fields: Infrastructure (1), Power plants (2), Mechanical plumbing (3), Telecom-
munication (4), Railways, Airports, Seaports (5), Pipe line, Fuel plants (6), Superstructure 
(7), Electric works (8). Superstructure and infrastructure were the major types of work.
Table 2. Distribution of amount of work types according to size of companies















1 131 72 20 53% 52% 51%
2 74 36 5 30% 26% 13%
3 23 10 5 9% 7% 13%
>3 12 12 8 5% 9% 20%
No answer 7 8 1 3% 6% 3%
Total 247 138 39 100% 100% 100%
Most companies specified the bid price through market research. Additional price es-
timation means were cost analysis of similar works and unit prices. 
The response rate in this study is high and noteworthy, because the industry profession-
als wanted to solve this issue in all ways. 
In the questionnaire the respondents were asked how often they face abnormally low 
tender inquisition. Moreover, they were asked to rate the reasons for the ALTs. Table 3 
shows the reasons of ALTs considering size of companies due to ALT Inquisition Rates 
from the data collected. ALT Inquisition means that if the proposed tender is below a 
threshold value determined by some formula, the tender will go through a screening pro-
cess by the tendering agency. ALT Inquisition rate counts for how often the contract faces 
the screening process. 
The methods of determining prices are shown in Table 4. It can be easily seen that prices 
are usually determined by market research.
5. Multinomial logistic regression of ALTs
Logistic regression is a model used for prediction of the probability of occurrence of an 
event. It makes use of several predictor variables that may be either numerical or categories 
(Agresti 2002). Logistic regression has 3 types of models. One of the types of models is 
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multinomial logistic regression. This type of regression is used when data of response have 
categorical variables more than two. In this study, the response data was chosen as ALT In-
quisition rate. It has 4 variables, which are 0–25%, 26–50%, 51–75%, 76–100% Inquisition 
rates. SPSS software was used for the statistical analysis. Inquisition rates were coded by 
numbers from 1 to 4 respectively to increasing rates of inquisition from 0–25% to 76–100%.
Logistic regression has some assumptions (Garson 2014) but it does not require all 
the assumptions of normal regression. Response (dependent) variable should be coded 
meaningfully. Generally positive sign coding is used. Error terms are assumed to be inde-
pendent. Logistic regression does not require linearity between independent factors and 
dependent variables. Moreover, there should be no multicollinearity in the model. Large 
samples should be used because logistic regression uses maximum likelihood estimation. 
Large samples should be used so that there will be low standard errors. These assumptions 
were satisfied with the proposed statistical model. 
Table 3. Reasons of ALTs considering size of companies due to ALT inquisition rate







Miscalculation of bid price
Work experience document




Miscalculation of bid price
Inaccuracy of conceptual cost






Miscalculation of bid price
Inaccuracy of conceptual cost
Staying in business
Miscalculation of bid price
Inaccuracy of conceptual cost
Miscalculation of bid price
Work experience document
Staying in business






Miscalculation of bid price
Inaccuracy of conceptual cost
Staying in business
Inaccuracy of concep. cost










Miscalculation of bid price
Inaccuracy of conceptual cost




Inaccuracy of conceptual cost
Work experience document
Table 4. Methods of determining prices of work items
Small companies Medium companies Large companies
Market research 46% 45% 44%
Unit prices 25% 22% 20%
Determining most appropriate price 12% 15% 15%
Cost analysis of similar works 17% 18% 21%
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The odds ratio (Agresti 2002) is a measure of effect important in logistic regression. 
In multinomial logistic regression, estimates of independent variables are found by using 
relative reference category. In other words, odds ratio shows relative importance of variable 
to the reference category.
 
= =
Odds(event)Odds ratio exp( ) ;
Odds(other event)











where: P(y): Probability of occurrence.       
The reference category for dependent variable was chosen as 0–25% ALT Inquisition 
Rate. The reference category for independent variables was last the category which SPSS 
software automatically selected them. Qualitative data were coded numerically for entry to 
the software. Multicollinearity variables were found by using Spearman two-tailed correl-
ation. Elimination was carried out by considering least correspondence to the dependent 
variable. After the elimination process, standardized residuals were found and they were 
excluded from the model. However, in multinomial regression, SPSS does not calculate 
standardized residuals directly. So, residuals were first calculated by using difference of 
actual and estimated response category. Then, standard deviation and mean of residuals 
were found. Finally standardized residuals (SR) were found by using SPSS and values more 







where: SR: Standardized residuals; x : Mean of residuals; s: Standard deviation of residuals.
Three models were constructed which were P(26–50% ALT Inquisition Rate), P(51–75% 
ALT Inquisition Rate) and P(76–100% ALT Inquisition Rate) relative to P(0–25% ALT In-
quisition Rate) by using multinomial logistic regression function. The models are presented 
on Tables 4, 5 and 6. It should be noted that the p-values of the Wald test statistics in these 
three tables. The probability that a particular Wald test statistic is as extreme as, or more so, 
than what has been observed under the null hypothesis is defined by the p-value. In mul-
tinomial logistic regression, the interpretation of a parameter estimate’s significance is lim-
ited to the model in which the parameter estimate was calculated (IDRE 2014). Moreover, 
the odd ratios for the predictors are the exponentiation of the coefficients. The odds ratio 
of a coefficient indicates how the risk of the outcome falling in the comparison group com-
pared to the risk of the outcome falling in the referent group changes with the variable in 
question. An odds ratio greater than one indicates that the risk of the outcome falling in the 
comparison group relative to the risk of the outcome falling in the referent group increases 
as the variable increases. In other words, the comparison outcome is more likely. An odds 
ratio smaller than one indicates that the risk of the outcome falling in the comparison 
group relative to the risk of the outcome falling in the referent group decreases as the vari-
able increases. For a given predictor with a level of 95% confidence, it can be said that there 
is 95% confidence that the “true” population multinomial odds ratio lies between the lower 
and upper limit of the interval for outcome relative to the referent group. An advantage of a 
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CI is that it is illustrative; it provides a range where the “true” odds ratio may lie (Idre 2014).
Interpretation of multinomial regression is slightly different from other regression 
types. Estimates of independent variables are relative to the reference category like the de-
pendent variable. In SPSS, reference category for independent variables is last category for 
each independent variable. Table 5 is the model for P(26–50% ALT Inquisition Rate) with 
respect to P(0–25% ALT Inquisition Rate).The table lists the significant factors which cause 
higher inquisition rates. According to the first model, it was more likely that companies 
dealing with electric works will face more inquisitions compared to other works. Similarly, 
software usage, quality control system and restricted procedure with prequalification will 
reduce ALT inquisition rates. 
Table 6 is the model for P(51–75% ALT Inquisition Rate) with respect to P(0–25% ALT 
Inquisition Rate). It can be understood from odds ratios of second model that miscalcu-
lation of bid price will lead to higher ALT inquisition rates. On the contrary, asking work 
experience documents, quality control system and restricted procedure with prequalifica-
tion will reduce ALT inquisition rates.
Table 5. Parameter estimates of 26–50% ALT inquisition rate
B Std.  Error Wald df P Exp(B)
95% Confidence Interval for Exp(B)
Lower Bound Upper Bound
Intercept –5.434 1.556 12.197 1 0.000
X1 2.784 1.088 6.552 1 0.010 16.179 1.920 136.346
X2 –2.210 0.545 16.459 1 0.000 0.110 0.038 0.319
X3 1.836 0.837 4.816 1 0.028 6.271 1.217 32.314
X4 2.679 0.757 12.518 1 0.000 14.570 3.303 64.267
Where: B – Estimated multinomial logistic regression coefficients; Std. Error – Standard errors of the 
individual regression coefficients for the two respective models estimated; Wald – Wald chi-square test 
that tests the null hypothesis that the estimate equals 0; df – The degrees of freedom for each of the 
variables included in the model; p – The p-values of the coefficients or the probability that, within a 
given model, the null hypothesis that a particular predictor’s regression coefficient is zero given that the 
rest of the predictors are in the model; Exp(B) – The odds ratios for the predictors; 95% Confidence 
Interval for Exp(B): This is the Confidence Interval (CI) for an individual multinomial odds ratio given 
the other predictors are in the model relative to the referent group; X1– Electric works; X2 – Software 
usage; X3 – Quality control; X4 – Restricted procedure with prequalification.
Table 6. Parameter estimates of 51–75% ALT inquisition rate
B Std.Error Wald df P Exp(B)
95% Confidence Interval for Exp(B)
Lower Bound Upper Bound
Intercept –9.493 1.910 24.693 1 0.000
X1 1.590 0.544 8.557 1 0.003 4.905 1.690 14.237
X2 1.437 0.626 5.272 1 0.022 4.208 1.234 14.349
X3 1.439 0.714 4.057 1 0.044 4.217 1.040 17.105
X4 3.731 1.081 11.921 1 0.001 41.729 5.018 346.977
Where: X1: Miscalculation of bid price; X2: Asking work experience document; X3: Quality control; 
X4: Restricted procedure with prequalification. 
Technological and Economic Development of Economy, 2017, 23(6): 848–859 857
Table 7. Parameter estimates of 76–100% ALT inquisition rate
B Std.Error Wald df P Exp(B)
95% Confidence Interval for Exp(B)
Lower Bound Upper Bound
Intercept –5.208 1.454 12.826 1 0.000
X1 –2.677 1.308 4.188 1 0.041 0.069 0.005 0.893
X2 1.442 0.615 5.503 1 0.019 4.229 1.268 14.108
X3 1.981 0.812 5.953 1 0.015 7.252 1.477 35.621
X4 –1.763 0.570 9.581 1 0.002 0.171 0.056 0.524
X5 –2.603 1.159 5.047 1 0.025 0.074 0.008 0.717
X6 2.213 0.669 10.942 1 0.001 9.144 2.464 33.932
Where: X1– Regular payment of contracting authority; X2 – Miscalculation of bid price; X3 – Asking 
work experience document; X4 – Software usage; X5 – Quality control; X6 – Restricted procedure with 
prequalification.
Last model (Table 7) stated that regular payment of contracting authority will signific-
antly reduce ALT inquisition rates. The factors in Table 5 are also significant at this level. 
Software usage also is significant at this level similarly as Table 4.
Conclusions
Abnormally low tenders are one the most serious problems in procurement systems. Both 
researchers and construction industry search on the matter of solving this problem. In this 
paper, a questionnaire was prepared and collected data was analysed to capture reasons 
and possible solution to ALTs. To fit this purpose, three models were constructed which 
were P(26–50% ALT Inquisition Rate), P(51–75% ALT Inquisition Rate), P(76–100% ALT 
Inquisition Rate) relative to P(0–25% ALT Inquisition Rate) by using multinomial logistic 
regression function. 
According to ALT questionnaire, prices of work items in a tender are determined by 
market research at most. Also a positive weak association was found between ambiguity 
in tender document and cost analysis of similar works. If contracting authority also pre-
pares conceptual cost by market research, difference between conceptual cost and bid price 
of contractor decreases. Decrease in this difference provides ALT to decrease. Moreover, 
decrease in difference between conceptual cost and tender price is the one of the aims of 
e-procurement. Large ratio of 0–25% ALTinquisition rate emphasizes that, prices of work 
items have to be found by market research. 
The significant factors for different inquisition rates were captures by the statistical 
analysis. For all three rates, quality control and restricted procedure with prequalification 
were found to be significant. It was found out from questionnaire that proper and sufficient 
quality control is not applied in construction period. It was determined from statistical 
tests that adequate and proper quality control reduces ALT Inquisition rate. This shows 
that contractors should adopt an effective quality control system to reduce ALT inquisi-
tion. Moreover, in tendering, restricted procedure with prequalification will reduce ALT 
problems. Electrical works need special attention during tendering process. For higher 
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inquisition rates asking work experience document is significant. This shows that doing 
similar jobs in the past will reduce ALT inquisition. Also regular payment of contracting 
authority will lead to less inquisition rates. 
Questionnaire results and statistical tests reveal that computer software users generally 
do not face with ALT inquisition. Use of softwares with proper quantity take-off provides 
determining of bid price properly. Therefore, use of software computer software will de-
crease ALT ratio if it is used with experienced staff. 
This paper listed a multinomial logistic regression model on 430 company data to de-
velop strategies to reduce ALT inquisition rates. 
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